We study the equilibrium existence problem in normal form and qualitative games in which it is possible to associate with each nonequilibrium point an open neighborhood and a collection of deviation strategies such that, at any nonequilibrium point of the neighborhood, a player can increase her payo¤ by switching to the deviation strategy designated for her. An equilibrium existence theorem for compact, quasiconcave games with two players is established. We propose a new form of the better-reply security condition, called the strong single deviation property, that covers games whose set of Nash equilibria is not necessarily closed.
Introduction
A number of generalizations and strengthenings of Reny's equilibrium existence theorem for better-reply secure games have been proposed recently. Among them are papers by Barelli and Soza (2009 ), Carmona (2011 ), de Castro (2011 ), McLennan, Monteiro, and Tourky (2009 ), and Reny (2009 .
In this paper, we look at the equilibrium existence problem in normal form and qualitative games through the prism of a property called by Reny (2009) the single deviation property. Both better-reply secure games and diagonally transfer continuous games (Baye, Tian, Zhou, 1993) possess this property. According to it, if a strategy pro…le is not a Nash equilibrium, then there exist an open neighborhood and a full pro…le of deviation strategies -one for each player -such that, at any point of the neighborhood, a player can increase her payo¤ by switching to her deviation strategy. Intuitively, if the single deviation property holds and the game has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, we can associate with each strategy pro…le a neighborhood and a collection of constant valued correspondences de…ned on the neighborhood. With the help of a partition of unity and an assumption imposed on the convex hulls of deviation strategies, Barelli and Soza (2009, Theorem 2.2) glue the locally de…ned correspondences together into an upper hemicontinuous correspondence, de…ned on the Cartesian product of the players'strategy sets, to which Kakutani's …xed point theorem can be applied.
As is shown by a three player example in Reny (2009, Section 3) , replacing the better-reply security condition with the single deviation property does not result in a complete set of su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in compact, quasiconcave games. In that example, even though it is possible to …nd, for every point, a neighborhood and a collection of constant valued correspondences de…ned on the neighborhood, one cannot glue them together into a well behaved correspondence having the Cartesian product of the players'strategy sets as its domain. Nessah and Tian (2010) show that if, instead of the quasiconcavity condition, a property related to but stronger than the diagonal transfer quasiconcavity condition (Baye, Tian, and Zhou, 1993) is assumed, then the existence of an equilibrium follows.
The weak single deviation property, introduced in this paper, is weaker than the single deviation property in two respects: (1) deviation strategies need not be de…ned for all players, and (2) every neighborhood of a nonequilibrium point may contain equilibrium points, as in a second-price sealed-bid auction with two bidders having di¤erent valuations.
Intuitively, if a single player can increase her payo¤ using the same deviation strategy at every point of an open neighborhood of a nonequilibrium point, then having to de…ne deviation strategies for the rest of the players makes the abovementioned assumption on the convex hulls of deviation strategies less tractable. On the other hand, if deviation strategies are not necessarily de…ned for all players, then it is impossible to use a partition of unity as the glueing technique. Therefore, there is a need for applying di¤erent tools, such as majorized correspondences. A strengthening of Barelli and Soza's equilibrium existence theorem, Theorem 5, and its applications are studied in the last section of the paper, Section 4.
Theorem 3 states that every compact, quasiconcave, two-person game with the weak single deviation property has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if the players' strategy sets lie on the real line. To show Theorem 3, we proceed by contradiction, assuming that the game has no equilibrium. Then we construct an open cover of the Cartesian product of the players' strategy sets that satis…es the conditions of Theorem 2, a version of Theorem 5 for normal form games.
In Section 3, we introduce a strengthening of the weak single deviation property, the strong single deviation property. This property is not a generalization of the better-reply security condition, but another, slightly improved, form of it. Lemmas 1 and 2 show that the strong single deviation property is equivalent to the better-reply security condition in compact games with no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. As we demonstrate by example, the strong single deviation property makes it possible to apply Reny's equilibrium existence theorem to games with a noncompact set of pure strategy Nash equilibria. In Remark 1, we describe a possible way of amending the notion of a better-reply secure game.
Majorized correspondences have served as a powerful tool for analyzing qualitative and generalized games since the groundbreaking works by Borglin and Keiding (1976) and Yannelis and Prabhakar (1983) . At the heart of the proof of the above-mentioned Theorem 5 lies the notion of a domain L-majorized correspondence, a generalization of Yannelis and Prabhakar's notion of an L-majorized correspondence. Implicitly, the idea of domain L-majorization has been present in the literature studying majorized correspondences and their applications for quite a while. So, Yuan (1999) introduces into consideration a correspondence whose values majorize the values of the correspondence under study and that has a multivalued selection with open lower sections. This very idea stands behind L F C -majorized correspondences (Ding and Xia 2004) . Domain L-majorization, introduced in Section 4, goes a little farther: we do not majorize the values of the correspondence under study, only its domain.
Lemma 5 provides a set of su¢ cient conditions for a correspondence to be domain L-majorized that are equivalent, in the context of qualitative games, to Barelli and Soza's equilibrium existence conditions (Corollary 3). Intuitively, the main result of Section 4, Theorem 5, deals with qualitative games having a generalized weak single deviation property. Some of its applications are provided there. Corollary 4 is a version of the Fan-Browder collective …xed point theorem, and Corollary 5 is an equilibrium existence theorem for qualitative games.
The Weak Single Deviation Property
Consider a game G between n players where each player i's pure strategy set X i is a nonempty, compact subset of a Hausdor¤ topological vector space, and each payo¤ function u i is a bounded function from X = i2N X i to R (X being endowed with the product topology). Under these conditions, G = (X i ; u i ) i2N is called a compact game. As before, denote the set of players by N = f1; : : : ; ng. A game G = (X i ; u i ) i2N is quasiconcave if each X i is convex and u i ( ; x i ) : X i ! R is 4 quasiconcave for all i 2 N and all x i 2 X i ; where X i = k2N nfig X k . Denote by E G the set of all pure strategy Nash equilibria of G in X.
De…nition 1 Player i can secure a payo¤ of 2 R at x 2 X if there exists
The graph of G is de…ned by GrG = f(x; u) 2 X R n j u i (x) = u i for all i 2 N g.
For a subset B of a topological space X, we denote the interior of B in X by int X B, the boundary of B by @B, and the closure of B by clB.
De…nition 2 A game G = (X i ; u i ) i2N is better-reply secure if whenever (x ; u ) 2 clGrG and x 2 XnE G , some player i can secure a payo¤ strictly above u i at x .
Theorem 1 (Reny 1999 ) If G = (X i ; u i ) i2N is compact, quasiconcave, and betterreply secure, then it possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
One can verify that every better-reply secure game possesses the following property (see Reny 2009; Nessah and Tian 2010;  or Lemma 7 below).
De…nition 3 A game G = (X i ; u i ) i2N has the single deviation property if whenever x 2 XnE G , there exist d 2 X and a neighborhood U X (x) of x in X such that, for all x 0 2 U X (x), there is a player i for whom
We amend the de…nition of the single deviation property in two important respects. First, the requirement that a deviation strategy, d i , be de…ned for each player i can be prohibitive in applications (see the proof of Theorem 3). Second, we ought not to require that there be a player able to increase her payo¤ for those
that are Nash equilibria of G.
De…nition 4 A game G = (X i ; u i ) i2N has the weak single deviation property if whenever x 2 XnE G , there exist an open neighborhood U X (x) of x, a set of players
5
To simplify notation, we will write
Example 1 Consider a two-bidder second-price sealed-bid auction with complete information. Let 0 v 2 < v 1 1 and X 1 = X 2 = [0; 1]. Bidder i's payo¤ function is given by
where x i is player i's bid and v i is her valuation of the object. The game possesses the weak single deviation property. To verify this, for every x 2 XnE G choose an open neighborhood U X (x) that contains x, and put I(x) = f1; 2g and (d 1 (x); d 2 (x)) = (v 1 ; v 2 ). At the same time, the game does not have the single deviation property since the set of its pure strategy Nash equilibria is not closed.
Theorem 2 is an equilibrium existence result for games with the weak single deviation property. Its proof is postponed until Section 4, where a more general result, Theorem 5, is shown for qualitative games. For a set A, let hAi denote the family of its nonempty …nite subsets. In assumption (ii) of Theorem 2, we assume
Theorem 2 Let G = (X i ; u i ) i2N be a compact game. Suppose that (i) G has the weak single deviation property, i.e. for each x 2 XnE G , there exist an open neighborhood U X (x) of x, a set of players I(x) N , a collection of points fd i (x) 2 X i : i 2 I(x)g such that, for every x 0 2 U X (x)nE G , there exists i 2 I(x)
It is not di¢ cult to see that assumption (ii) of Theorem 2 is naturally satis…ed in a number of games. Among those are both quasiconcave games, such as secondprice sealed-bid auctions, and non-quasiconcave games, such as the duopoly game described in Example 1 of Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993) .
A compact, quasiconcave game with the weak single deviation property need not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The next example is borrowed from Reny (2009) .
Example 2 Consider a three-player game G = (X i ; u i ) 3 i=1 with X 1 = X 2 = X 3 = [0; 1]. The payo¤ functions are de…ned as follows. Let, for r 2 [0; 1],
Then, for x 3 2 [0;
elements are. As a result, we have to amend the …nite cover to make Theorem 2 applicable (see Appendix A for details).
The Strong Single Deviation Property
In this section, we introduce a strengthening of the weak single deviation property and show that it is another, slightly weakened, form of the better-reply security condition.
De…nition 5 A game G = (X i ; u i ) i2N has the strong single deviation property if whenever x 2 XnE G , there exist an open neighborhood U X (x) of x, a set of players
A game with the strong single deviation property need not be better-reply secure in the sense of De…nition 2.
Example 4 Consider a timing game between two players with X 1 = X 2 = [0; 1]. Player i's payo¤ function is given by
where
The set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game is
) :
It is easy to see that the game is not better-reply secure at (
). Now we show that it has the strong single deviation property.
We have to consider two possible cases. Case 1. If x 2 X is such that x i < x i for some i 2 f1; 2g, then put r =
, and "(x) = 1.
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Case 2. If x 2 X is such that x 1 = x 2 and x 1 1 2
, then put r =
, and "(x) = 1 2 . Verifying that the game possesses the strong single deviation property is a straightforward exercise in both cases.
The di¤erence between the strong single deviation property and the better-reply security condition is in the way Nash equilibria are treated.
Lemma 1 If a compact game G = (X i ; u i ) i2N with no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies has the strong single deviation property, then it is better-reply secure.
Proof. Assume that x 2 X and u 2 R n are such that (x ; u ) 2 clGrG. Since the game has the strong single deviation property, there exist an open neighborhood
We shall show that some player i can secure a payo¤ strictly above u i at x . Consider a net fx g converging to x such that the corresponding net fu(x )g tends to u . Then there exists b such that x 2 U X (x ) and
for all b and all i 2 I(x ). In particular, by the strong single deviation property,
The following corollary follows from Theorem 1 and Lemma 1.
is compact, quasiconcave, and has the strong single deviation property, then it possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Remark 1 It is not di¢ cult to relax the better-reply security condition to cover, for example, the above timing game. Instead of considering the graph of G, we can introduce the "nonequilibrium" graph of
for all i 2 N and x 2 XnE G g and replace the set clGrG in De…nition 2 with clGrnG, which will expand the scope of applications of Theorem 1.
The next lemma, along with Lemma 1, shows that the strong single deviation property is another, slightly weakened, form of the better-reply security condition.
Lemma 2 If a compact game G = (X i ; u i ) i2N is better-reply secure, then it has the strong single deviation property.
The proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix B. The closest to the strong single deviation property is the lower single deviation property, introduced by Reny (2009) . Its de…nition is as follows. For each i 2 N , let
has the lower single-deviation property if whenever x 2 XnE(G), there exists d 2 X and a neighborhood U of x such that for all x 0 2 U , there is a player i for whom
Since "(x) in De…nition 5 does not depend on x 0 and u i (x 0 ) u i (x 0 ) for each i 2 N and every x 0 2 X, a game with no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies that has the strong single deviation property also has the lower single deviation property. The latter property is a generalization of the better-reply security condition. In its turn, the strong single deviation property may be considered as a slightly improved version of the better-reply security condition. The lower single deviation property can also be improved upon in a similar manner.
Equilibrium Existence in Qualitative Games
The proof of the main result of the section, Theorem 5, relies on a generalization of the notion of an L-majorized correspondence (Yannelis and Prabhakar, 1983) .
Domain L-Majorized Correspondences
Let X be a nonempty subset of a topological space, Y be nonempty, convex subset of a vector space, and : X ! Y be a single-valued function. A correspondence
X for every y 2 Y ; F is of class L with respect to if (x) = 2 coF (x) for all x 2 X and it has open lower sections in X. In the special cases when Y = X and is the identity map on X and when X = n i=1 X i and : X ! X i is the projection of X onto X i and Y = X i , we will write L in place of L . The domain of F is de…ned by DomF = fx 2 X : F (x) 6 = ?g. If DomF = X, then we say that F is strict.
Given
The next maximal element existence result is equivalent to Browder's …xed point theorem (see Browder 1968, Theorem 1; Yannelis and Prabhakar 1983, Theorems 3.1 and 5.1).
Lemma 3 Let X be a nonempty, compact, convex subset of a Hausdor¤ topological vector space, and let F : X X be a correspondence of class L: Then there exists
The following lemma shows that, from the standpoint of applications, there are no di¤erences between L -majorized and locally L -majorized correspondences (see Yannelis and Prabhakar 1983, Corollary 5.1; or Bagh 1998 , Lemma 1.5).
Lemma 4 Let X be a nonempty, compact subset of a Hausdor¤ topological vector space, Y be a nonempty, convex subset of a vector space, and : X ! Y . Let
Among the conditions of Lemma 4 is a nonstandard one, namely that F is a strict correspondence. This condition is not restrictive since every proof using majorization tools proceeds by contradiction.
The proof of Lemma 4 follows along the lines of the proof of Corollary 1 of Borglin and Keiding (1976) (for details, see Ding et al. 1994 , Theorem 1; Ding and Tan 1993, Lemma 2, for the case when X is a paracompact topological space).
Corollary 2 (Yannelis and Prabhakar 1983, Corollary 5.1) follows from Lemmas 3 and 4 by way of contradiction.
Corollary 2 Let X be a nonempty, compact, convex subset of a Hausdor¤ topological vector space and F : X X be a locally L-majorized correspondence. Then there exists b
x 2 X such that F (b x) = ?.
Now, we introduce a generalization of the notion of an L-majorized correspondence.
De…nition 6 Let X be a nonempty subset of a topological space, Y be a nonempty, convex subset of a vector space, and let :
Clearly, if F is L -majorized, then it is domain L -majorized. Obviously, the converse does not necessarily hold.
Theorem 4 is a maximal element existence theorem for domain L-majorized correspondences.
Theorem 4 Let X be a nonempty, compact, convex subset of a Hausdor¤ topological vector space and F : X X be a domain L-majorized correspondence. Then there exists b
x 2 X such that F (b x) = ?:
The next lemma provides a set of su¢ cient conditions for a correspondence to be domain L -majorized.
Lemma 5 Let X be a compact Hausdor¤ topological space and Y be a nonempty, convex subset of a vector space. Let : X ! Y and F : X Y be a strict correspondence such that (i) for each x 2 X, there exist an open neighborhood U x of x in X and a correspondence F x : X Y with DomF x = U x and open lower sections in X; (ii) for each A 2 hXi and every
The proof of Lemma 5 is given in Appendix B, where is shown that assumptions (i) and (ii) imply the existence of a strict correspondence F : X Y of class L . It is worth noticing that another set of su¢ cient conditions obtains if assumption (ii) is replaced with the more conventional assumption that \ x2A U x Dom(\ x2A F x ) for each A 2 hXi (see, e.g., Yuan 1999, Theorem 3.1). However, the latter assumption has a strong ‡avor of value majorization.
Qualitative Games
As before, let N = f1; : : : ; ng be a …nite set of players. Each player i's strategy set X i is a nonempty, compact, and convex subset of a Hausdor¤ topological vector space. Let X = i2N X i and P i : X X i be player i's preference correspondence. Consider a qualitative game = (X i ; P i ) i2N . A strategy pro…le x 2 X is an equilibrium of if P i (x) = ? for all i 2 N .
For a qualitative game = (X i ; P i ) i2N , we call the set Dom = [ i2N DomP i the domain of .
Obviously, if is domain L-majorized, then it has an equilibrium b x 2 X; that is, P i (b x) = ? for each i 2 N . Therefore, if we want to show the existence of an equilibrium in a qualitative game , a legitimate way of doing that is to show that the game is domain L-majorized. However, it is important to keep in mind that the correspondence F should not only have open lower sections but also satisfy the condition that x = 2 coF (x) for all x 2 X. Extending Lemma 5 to qualitative games produces an equilibrium existence result which is analogous to Theorem 2.2 of Barelli and Soza (2009) 
Corollary 3 Let X i be a nonempty, compact, convex subset of a Hausdor¤ topological vector space and = (X i ; P i ) i2N be a qualitative game. Suppose, for each From the standpoint of applications, assumption (i) of Corollary 3 is too strong. Intuitively, if P i (x) = ? for some i, then DomD i x should be the empty set as well. Moreover, assuming that (i) holds for all i 2 N makes it more di¢ cult, or even in some cases impossible, to satisfy (ii).
Theorem 5 Let X i be a nonempty, compact, convex subset of a Hausdor¤ topological vector space and = (X i ; P i ) i2N be a qualitative game. Suppose, for each x 2 Dom , there exist I(x) N , and an (n + 1)-tuple (D Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that has no equilibrium, i.e. Dom = X. The compactness of X implies that the open covering fU x : x 2 Xg of X contains a …nite subcover fU x j : j 2 Jg, where J is a …nite set. Let fV x j : j 2 Jg be an open re…nement of fU x j : j 2 Jg such that clV x j U x j for every j 2 J (see Aliprantis and Border 2006, pp. 169-171) . For each j 2 J and each i 2 N , de…ne a correspondence
It is not di¢ cult to see that each F j i has open lower sections. Then for each i 2 N , the correspondence
has open lower sections. Therefore, the correspondence F : X X de…ned by
Fix some z 2 X. It lies in some V x j . We have to show that
, and, consequently, z = 2 coF (z). Since F is of class L and Dom = DomF = X, is domain L-majorized, a contradiction.
Corollary 4 is a version of the Fan-Browder collective …xed point theorem. In Lassonde and Schenkel (1992, Theorem 5) , it follows from a generalization of the KKM lemma, which is a re ‡ection of the fact that the KKM lemma and Browder's …xed point theorem are two equivalent results (see Yannelis 1991, pp. 105-109 , for an in-depth explanation). Corollary 5 is a strengthening of Corollary 5 for qualitative games.
Corollary 5 Let each X i be a nonempty, compact, convex subset of a Hausdor¤ topological vector space and let = (X i ; P i ) i2N be a qualitative game. Assume that, for each i 2 N , the correspondence P i : X X i is domain L-majorized. Then has an equilibrium in X.
Proof. Since the players'preference correspondences are domain L-majorized, for each i 2 N there exists F i : X X i of class L such that DomP i DomF i . By Corollary 4, there exists x 2 X such that F i (x) = ? for all i 2 N . Since
Appendix A
This appendix contains the proof of Theorem 3 and an intuitive explanation of the amending technique used in the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3
Assume, by contradiction, that G has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Since G has the weak single deviation property, for every x 2 X there exist an open ball B X (x; 3r(x)) of x in X, a set of players I(x) f1; 2g, and a collection of deviation strategies K(x) = fd i 2 X i : i 2 I(x)g such that, for every x 0 2 B X (x; 3r(x)),
We will amend the initial open cover of X, fB X (x; r(x)) : x 2 Xg, in a number of steps. First, we additionally assume that, for every x 2 X, r(x); I(x), and K(x) satisfy the following three conditions: (a) if d i 6 = x i for some i 2 I(x), then jd i x i j > 5r(x); (b) I(x) is minimal in the following sense: If I = f1; 2g, there are no r > 0 and
for some r > 0 and every x 0 in B X (x; 3r), at least one of the following inequalities holds:
As is shown below, if the elements of the cover satisfy these three simple conditions, we do not have to further amend them in most cases. Condition (a) is not restrictive since, for every x 2 X, the radius r(x) can be chosen arbitrarily small.
If I(x) = f1; 2g, then condition (b) states that, given K(x), it is impossible to reduce the number of elements of I(x) by choosing a smaller r(x). One can notice that condition (c) is also not burdensome. If d i = x i for some i 2 I(x) and there are r > 0 and
, then we replace B X (x; r(x)) in the cover with B X (x; r) and d i in K(x) = fd 1 ; d 2 g with d i . A useful fact to keep in mind is that if d i = x i for some i 2 I(x), then d i does not coincide with x i . The compactness of X implies that the open cover fB X (x; r(x)) : x 2 Xg of X contains a …nite subcover fB X (x j ; r(x j )) : j 2 Jg, where J = f1; : : : ; kg. It is useful to notice that if B X (x s ; r(x s ))) \ B X (x t ; r(x t )) 6 = ? and r(x s ) > r(x t ) for some s; t 2 J, then B X (x t ; r(x t )) B X (x s ; 3r(x s ))). Hence for every x 0 2 B X (x t ; r(x t )),
Without loss of generality, we also assume that r(x s ) > r(x t ) if s; t 2 J and s < t, and that each B X (x j ; r(x j )) contains some points of X that do not lie in any of the other elements of the subcover. The latter assumption will help us avoid dealing with empty sets in the course of amending the cover. Let us show that, for our purposes, it is enough to focus attention on the intersections of just two elements of the cover. Now consider the intersection of the …rst two elements of the cover. Let there be a point z
First, we will show that it might happen only in one case (Case 7), and then we will describe how to amend the cover to preclude Case 7 for every pair of intersecting elements of the cover.
As before, we assume that r(x 1 ) > r(x 2 ) and that u 1 (d
is not so, renumber the players and/or redirect one or both axes). Then the inclusions z 
and replace B X (x 1 ; r(x 1 )) in the cover fB X (x j ; r(x j )) : j 2 Jg with V 2 X (x 1 ; r(x 1 )) = B X (x 1 ; r(x 1 ))nclB X (x 2 ; r(x 2 )). We have to add to the cover a …nite number of open balls covering the compact set A = @B X (x 2 ; r(x 2 ))\clB X (x 1 ; r(x 1 )). For every x 2 A with x 2 6 = d I(x 1 ) (for B X (x; r(x))) with K(x) K(x 1 ) such that for every I(x 2 ) with K(x) K(x 2 ) such that for every
Since A is a compact set, it has a …nite subset fx Then consider the sets V 2 X (x 1 ; r(x 1 )) and B X (x 3 ; r(x 3 )). If needed, we again amend the cover of X with the help of the just described technique, denoting
). After considering all the pairs V j 1 X (x 1 ; r(x 1 )) and B X (x j ; r(x j )), j = 2; : : : ; k, we denote V (x 1 ) = V k X (x 1 ; r(x 1 )) and proceed to considering B X (x 2 ; r(x 2 )) and B X (x 3 ; r(x 3 )), and so on. If needed, the amending technique is applied again.
One can see that the last ball that might need amending is B X (x k 1 ; r(x k 1 )). Hence,
So, after a …nite number of rounds of amendment, we will get a …nite open cover of X, fV (x j ) : j = 1; : : : ; Rg with I(x j ) and
(b) for every pair s; t 2 f1; : : : ; Rg, s
g for some i 2 f1; 2g, where again we assume that d
Let x be some point of X. Since fV (x 1 ); : : : ; V (x R )g is a cover of X, there exists V (x j ); j 2 f1; : : : ; Rg, such that x 2 V (x j ). Put U X (x) = V (x j ) and I(x) = I(x j ).
. Then the conditions of Theorem 2 are satis…ed, a contradiction.
Proofs for Cases 1-6
The following fact will be used frequently below: It follows from the quasiconcavity of u 1 (u 2 ) in x 1 (x 2 ) and the inclusion z 0 1 2 cofd
So it is important to keep in mind that our assumptions imply that u 1 (d 
) and the quasiconcavity of u 2 in x 2 imply that it must be the case that
, which contradicts condition (c).
Case 2. We now assume that d
it must be the case that u 2 (d 
2 ), it must be the case that u 2 (z
Assume, by contradiction, that u 2 (z 1 ; d 2 2 ) u 2 (z) for some z 2 B X (x 2 ; r(x 2 )) with
). Let us show this for the sake of completeness. Assume, by contra- 
Let us show this. Assume, by contradiction, that u 2 (z 1 ; d At …rst glance, it looks like not much has changed. However, it is not so. For example, if for some x 2 A \ intC, there is z 0 2 B X (x; r(x)) \ B X (x 2 ; r(x 2 )) such that z 0 i 2 cofd i ; d 2 i g, i = 1; 2, then, obviously, I(x) = f1; 2g. Moreover, as we have shown in the proof of Theorem 3, it is possible only if d i = x i for some i 2 f1; 2g (Case 7). However, this is not the case by construction. Therefore, the minimal I(x) is a one-element set.
Appendix B Proof of Lemma 2
Fix x 2 XnE G . Let A(x) be the set of 2 R n such that (x; ) 2 clGrG. For each i 2 N , de…ne u i : X ! R by u i (x i ; x i ) = lim inf Since G is better-reply secure, for each = ( 1 ; : : : ; N ) 2 A(x) there is i( ) 2 N such that i( ) (x i( ) ) > i( ) . Pick " > 0 and r > 0 such that i( ) (x i( ) ) > 0 i( ) + " for all 0 2 B R n ( ; r ). We can say that player i( ) secures the neighborhood B R n ( ; r ) at x. Since A(x) is compact, the cover fB R n ( ; r ) : 2 A(x)g contains a …nite subcover fB R n ( j ; r j ) : j = 1; : : : ; kg. Let "(x) = 1 2 min j2f1;:::;kg " j . Denote by J i (x) the collection of all j 2 f1; : : : ; kg such that player i secures B R n ( j ; r j ) at x. Let I(x) = fi 2 N : J i (x) 6 = ?g and i = max j2J i ( j + r j ). Then, by the de…n-ition of the least upper bound, for each i 2 I(x) there exists d i 2 X i such that
. From the lower semicontinuity of u i in x i , we deduce that
i in some open neighborhood U X i (x i ) of x i . We claim that there exists an open neighborhood U X (x) of x such that, for every x 0 2 U X (x), there is some i 2 I(x) with u i (d i ; z i ) "(x) > u i (x 0 ) for all z i 2 U X i (x i ). If it is not so, then one can construct a net fx g converging to x such that, for each and each i 2 I(x), u i (d i ; z i ) "(x) u i (x ) for some z i 2 U X i (x i ). Since the payo¤ functions are bounded, there is no loss of generality in assuming that the net fu(x )g converges to some 2 A(x). Then, for some j 2 f1; : : : kg, there exists b such that u(x ) 2 B R n ( j ; r j ) for all b . Therefore, 
Proof of Lemma 5
The compactness of X implies that the open cover fU x : x 2 Xg of X contains a …nite subcover fU x j : j 2 Jg, where J is a …nite set. Let fG x j : j 2 Jg be a closed re…nement of fU x j : j 2 Jg such that G x j U x j for each j 2 J. For each j 2 J, de…ne a correspondence F j : X Y by
Assumption (ii) implies that (z) = 2 coF j (z) for all z 2 G x j . Each F j has open lower sections in X since, for each y 2 Y , Therefore F : X Y de…ned by F (z) = \ j2J F j (z) also has open lower sections. By construction, DomF = X and F is of class L .
